Built to last till the 2070s, the journey of the F-35 has just begun. Its peer-adversaries have developed advanced air defense networks, 5th generation fighter aircraft and complex anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities.
What will the F-35 encounter within the airspace in the periphery of the Chinese mainland? Let’s venture into the uncharted.
Importance of Air Superiority
Legacy of U.S. Air Superiority
The legacy warfighting concept of the United States relies on the ability to use air power to gain control over the battlefield. Hence, establishing air superiority is a key factor for U.S. operations. Since the U.S. engages in combined-arms warfare, air superiority is relevant to all branches of the U.S. military. However, the emergence of competitors like China sheds some light on the U.S.’ overreliance on its dominance in the skies.
In order to achieve air superiority, there are different ways to accomplish that goal. Here are the key components to successfully achieving air superiority:
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Air-to-Air Combat
Destruction of Enemy Aircraft in Air-to-Air Battle.
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Offensive Counter Air
Destruction of Enemy Air Bases and Support-Infrastructure.
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Defensive Counter Air
Protection of the Airspace against Enemy Aircraft with Air Defenses.
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Gaining Air Superiority
Ability to Conduct Operations without Interference by Opposing Air Forces.
For decades, U.S. air power has paved the way for military success in various theaters of war. In particular, air superiority created an asymmetrical advantage that conventional and irregular forces could not match in the past.
China is Emerging as a Peer-Competitor
The last time the U.S. fought against a peer-adversary is long ago. Since then U.S. air operations have not been significantly challenged. That could change with the rise of China and its subsequent military modernization. The intense security competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific poses serious risks of future escalation.
China initially experienced enormous economic growth with which it was able to finance its military expansion. The Navy and Air Force in particular received funding for modernization. Among many other reforms, the PLA’s command structure was reorganized to make it more flexible and suitable for joint operations.
Additionally, the PLA’s growing fleet of modern 4th and 5th generation aircraft starts to challenge U.S. aircraft in air-to-air capabilities. Beyond that, the development of integrated air defense systems (IADS) also poses a threat to U.S. air superiority.
By that, China achieved to gain multiple capabilities to secure not only its own airspace, but also that in its periphery.
A Legacy in Question
Over the last two decades, the U.S. has focused almost exclusively on the war on terror, while disregarding conventional warfare. Now the return of peer adversaries like China forces the U.S. to rethink its approach to conventional warfare. As their goal to stay the dominant power in the Indo-Pacific remains unchanged, the U.S. has to adapt.
For example, in the Chinese maritime periphery, the former unrestricted U.S. ability to project air power has been put into question. Especially the development of a more sophisticated air defense architecture primarily aims to impede the U.S. ability to gain air superiority within the first island chain. As a result, this development puts the U.S. legacy warfigthing concept at risk.
If U.S. forces can no longer rely on air superiority, they will eventually find other ways to achieve their goals. For example, if short-range airstrikes are no longer feasible, the U.S. will likely resort to longer-ranges strikes. As long as U.S. platforms and weapon systems remain versatile, U.S. strategy can adapt to new threats. Thus, enhancing long-range capabilities like hypersonic and cruise missiles and stealth bombers like the B-21 already indicates the changing approach.
Consequently, the U.S. aiming to keep a dominant position, even in the contested environments around the Chinese coast. This is where the F-35 has the potential to play a key role.
F-35 – Entering Contested Airspace
In the event of escalating tensions between the U.S. and China, parts of the Indo-Pacific would become contested. Some regions such as the South China Sea (SCS) or the Chinese coastal waters would be even highly contested. Due to China’s extensive IADS and numerous modern fighter aircraft, non-stealth aircraft would have difficulties entering that airspace. A good example of this is the South China Sea with the Spratly Islands. To illustrate the difficulties the F-35 might face in such an environment, let’s take a closer look at the Spratlys.
Introducing the Spratly Islands
Given the Spratly Islands’ relatively central location in the South China Sea, their strategic value to China in furthering its goal of maritime control in the South China Sea is beyond question. For this reason, the PLA built multiple artificial bases in the Spratly Islands. Despite these bases being far away from the mainland, they have the capacity to launch operations in the SCS and project power in the region. That includes the following capabilities:
- Radar and communications infrastructure to monitor activities.
- Air defense capabilities to secure the airspace and deny enemy forces from entering.
- Anti-ship missile capabilities to keep surface combatants at bay.
- Airfields to launch strike aircraft and even long-range bombers.
- Deep sea ports to support PLA Navy vessels.
Aside from numerous other smaller outposts, it’s the ‘Big Three’, that have the largest and most advanced infrastructure. The ‘Big Three’ consist of Subi Reef, Mischief Reef and Fiery Cross Reef. All three together form a triangle, from which PLA forces can reach a large portion of the SCS.
The Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea and consist of several maritime features. Some of them are the subject of ongoing disputes. Due to their central location in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are of great strategic importance.
The Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea and consist of several maritime features. Some of them are the subject of ongoing disputes. Due to their central location in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are of great strategic importance.
The Spratly Islands are located in the South China Sea and consist of several maritime features. Some of them are the subject of ongoing disputes. Due to their central location in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands are of great strategic importance.
Fiery Cross Reef is located in the south-west of the Spratly Islands and comes with many advanced military installations, modern infrastructure including a 3 km runway suitable for strategic bomber and fighter aircraft.
Fiery Cross Reef is located in the south-west of the Spratly Islands and comes with many advanced military installations, modern infrastructure including a 3 km runway suitable for strategic bomber and fighter aircraft.
Fiery Cross Reef is located in the south-west of the Spratly Islands and comes with many advanced military installations, modern infrastructure including a 3 km runway suitable for strategic bomber and fighter aircraft.
Subi Reef is large artificially built base in the north-west of the Spratly Islands. It reportedly accommodates a proclaimed 'counter-stealth radar', which according to Chinese media is capable to detect stealth aircraft.
Subi Reef is large artificially built base in the north-west of the Spratly Islands. It reportedly accommodates a proclaimed 'counter-stealth radar', which according to Chinese media is capable to detect stealth aircraft.
Subi Reef is large artificially built base in the north-west of the Spratly Islands. It reportedly accommodates a proclaimed 'counter-stealth radar', which according to Chinese media is capable to detect stealth aircraft.
Mischief Reef is the largest artificially built base by the PLA in the Spratly Islands. With a 2.7 km runway and numerous radar and communications facilities, Mischief Reef allows to closely monitor activities in the South China Sea.
Mischief Reef is the largest artificially built base by the PLA in the Spratly Islands. With a 2.7 km runway and numerous radar and communications facilities, Mischief Reef allows to closely monitor activities in the South China Sea.
Mischief Reef is the largest artificially built base by the PLA in the Spratly Islands. With a 2.7 km runway and numerous radar and communications facilities, Mischief Reef allows to closely monitor activities in the South China Sea.
With regard to the F-35, we will primarily concentrate on the PLA’s air defense and radar capabilities in the SCS. Nevertheless, we will keep in mind the threat of fighter aircraft as part of Chinese A2/AD capabilities.
Air Defenses in the Spratly Islands
Back in 2018, the PLA once already deployed its long-range HQ-9 air defense in the SCS. Although only for a brief period, it demonstrated the PLA’s ability to successfully deploy the HQ-9 in the SCS. In the event of a conflict, there is therefore the possibility that more of them will be stationed on the Paracel and especially the Spratly Islands.
If the PLA deployed the HQ-9 on all of the ‘Big Three’, they could manage to cover > 70% of the area of the Spratly Islands. In case of the HQ-9B, the PLA could cover the entirety of the Spratly Islands. On the high end, the S-400 could effectively cut the SCS in half and create a large air defense umbrella. This umbrella would have a range between 200 – 400 km, depending on the system. Beyond that these long-range systems could even threaten aircraft within south-western parts of Philippine airspace. However, the S-400 has not yet been reported to be deployed in the Spratly Islands.
Description | Total Area | ||
Spratly Islands | 410,000 kmยฒ | ||
System | Covered Area | Range | % of Total Area |
HQ-9 | 269,000 kmยฒ | 200 km | 72% |
HQ-9B | > 410,000 kmยฒ | 250 - 300 km | 100% |
S-400 | > 750,000 kmยฒ | up to 400 km | 100% |
Moreover, the ‘Big Three could also effectively cover each other by using the HQ-9B and S-400, because the range of these systems would allow to create overlapping air defense zones. Due to the greater risk, this would most likely make the use of non-stealth aircraft impossible. On the other hand, stealth aircraft such as the F-35 are more likely to get closer to these bases without being engaged by air defenses. Although the F-35 may be detected by radar, additional steps in the kill chain must be completed before air defenses can finally engage the F-35.
F-35 vs. Radar
For example AWACS, tanker or bomber aircraft have a much larger radar cross section (RCS) than smaller fighters. Thus, radars can pick up their signatures at long distances. Additionally, their larger airframes make them less meneuverable, which in turn makes them more vulnerable to air defenses. In that case, the HQ-9 variants would be more likely to exploit their maximum range. Consequently, engaging these aircraft is much easier, even if they are still hundreds of kilometers away.
In contrast, the F-35 has a better chance to remain undetected for a longer time. The effective range, at which the HQ-9 or S-400 can detect, track and engage an F-35 will be much shorter. Due to the F-35’s stealth characteristics, the detection radars would probably detect the F-35 much later. So, the effectiveness of these air defenses also depends heavily on the characteristics of the aircraft, that penetrates their airspace.
It is important to remember, that the critical factor in this calculation is the detection and tracking capability of the radar. In short: a surface-to-air missile (SAM) is reliant on the detection radar. Even a SAM with a range of 1,000 km would be useless without a powerful radar for target detection. Therefore, it’s important to understand how the different elements of the entire system work together.
What aircraft might the F-35 encounter over the Spratly Islands?
Moreover, the runways on the Big Three can accomodate fighters and larger aircraft. Beyond that, the PLA Air Force’s H-6 bomber could also operate from these bases. However, the practicality of deploying strategic bombers to these remote islands is questionable. Due to their long-range they could also operate from secure air bases on the mainland. Sheltering H-6 bombers would be problematic, as there are only few large hangers at these bases. Also, they could not properly disperse and subsequently become an easy target for air strikes.
So the main issue for F-35 operations in the Spratly Islands is probably the presence of PLA fighter aircraft. To this day, 4th and 4+ generation fighter aircraft like the J-10, J-11 and J-16 were already spotted there. With 24 hangers for fighter-sized aircraft, each of the Big Three can accomodate an entire regiment of fighter aircraft. From these forward bases they could then respond quickly to any intruding aircraft. Moreover, the PLA Navy’s carrier-based J-15 could also intervene, given that a Chinese carrier is on station in the SCS. Interestingly, however, the latest Chinese stealth fighter, the J-20, has not yet been seen at these bases.
Despite the J-20 and the upcoming J-31 (FC-31), Chinese fighters like the J-11 or J-16 are not stealthy. However, they are fast an can carry more weapons than the F-35. For example, a flight of four F-35s could engage a maximum of 16 enemy aircraft. Also this is only possible, when this flight is carrying the max. number of air-to-air missiles. If their mission requires engaging actual ground-targets, the number of air-to-air missiles will be much lower.
If the radar network in the Spratlys manages to detect and track the F-35, not only PLA fighters can engage, but also the long-range air defenses on the islands. Equipped with PL-15 BVRAAM, PLA fighters can potentially hit targets at a range of 150-200 km. In addition, the PLA’s growing ISR drone fleet provides better situational awareness and act as early warning platforms. The long-range PL-15 in particular can benefit from this increasing sensor density. Consequently, this missile could pose a real threat if PLA radars manage to track the F-35.
In the context of air defense, fighter aircraft can play a crucial role in extending the range to engage enemy aircraft.
Chinese Radar Capabilities in the Spratly Islands
First, as the PLA seeks maritime control in the SCS, it needs sufficient radar capabilities to monitor activities in the region. Therefore, the PLA built large radar arrays and communications facilities at these bases. To provide a better overview of the PLA’s radar capabilities in the SCS, let’s take a look at the most significant installations, that were built on the ‘Big Three’.
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Counter – Stealth Radar
Alleged Counter-Stealth Radar on Subi Reef.
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Ground – Based Radar
Surface-Level Radar Installation to Detect Enemy Forces.
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Airborne Radar
Airborne Platform with Radar Equipment to Detect Enemy Forces at greater Ranges.
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Over the Horizon Radar
Radar Array to Detect Enemy Forces beyond the Radar Horizon.
Counter-Stealth Radar
On Subi Reef, the PLA built a radar array, which the Chinese claim to have counter-stealth capabilities. Provided that its capabilities are as claimed by the Chinese, it poses an additional risk for stealth aircraft. Therefore, it can potentially detect and track the F-35. However, these claimes have not been independently verified.
Nevertheless, this case highlights the PLA’s efforts to develop a counter to the U.S. advantage in stealth technology. Therefore, we can expect these efforts to intensify as U.S. military presence increases in the Indo-Pacific.
Ground-Based Line of Sight Radar
To give a rough estimate, the potential range of a ground-based line-of-sight radar system can be up to 425 km, assuming the target is flying at an altitude of 10,000 km. In contrast, the same radar is capable of detecting a surface-level target at a distance of only about 35 km. This illustrates how big the difference in radar coverage can be when the target is at a different altitude.
Airborne Line of Sight Radar
Since the PLA is ramping up the numbers of its early warning aircraft, it is important to recognize their importance for expanding radar coverage beyond the capabilities of ground-based radars. This will allow them to extend radar coverage beyond the Spratlys ant monitor larger parts of the SCS. Moreover, because these radars are airborne, they can quickly relocate and cover different regions. For example, the Chinese KJ-500 can detect targets up to 770 km via its line-of-sight radar, when the target flies at an altitude of 10,000 m. In comparison, targets at surface-level can be detected at a range of about 360 km.
Over-The-Horizon Radar
Additionally, all three bases are expected to have over-the-horizon (OTH) radars. On the one hand, that allows to locate surface ships or aircraft beyond the line-of-sight at distances of around 250 km using active sensors. One the other hand, these radars can also passively detect targets at a distance of around 450 km by picking up electronic emissions from approaching aircraft or ships.
By connecting all these radar types and platforms into a larger network, air defenses are becoming more effective and subsequently more dangerous for U.S. forces. Taking that a step further, PLA Navy ships could potentially log into this network in order to use the network’s resources to extend their own radar capabilities. As a result, they could engage targets more efficiently.
From the PLA’s perspective, these radar capabilities provide a crucial information for aerial and naval operations in the SCS.
China’s Advancing Air Defense Capabilities
Historically, China sourced its air defense systems from the Soviet Union and its successor state, Russia. For a long time, it was the only source for China to aquire potent surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems. That has changed over time. Today, there are more and more indigenious desigs, mostly based on Russian systems. As a result, the PLA became increasingly independent from Russian arms sales. Consequently, the Chinese air defense architecture grew rapidly.
Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS)
Today, the PLA can rely on a variety of platforms to secure the Chinese airspace. Due to that, the PLA was able to adopt the concept of multiple interconnected defense layers to create a dense air defense network. This network would consist of different systems with varying operational ranges. From point-defenses to long-range ballistic missiles defenses, the PLA is using any kind of modern system to protect the vast Chinese airspace. Especially the coastal regions and the politicial and ecnomic centers are strategically important.
- Area around Beijing with its political center.
- Major urban areas to protect the economic centers.
- The area close to the Taiwan Strait.
- Bases in the Spratly and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea.
Similar to the Russians, the Chinese also developed these complex air defense structures into IADS. That means, that multiple air defense elements such as radars, communication systems, and SAM batteries work together in a larger network. All these elements are then connected by a C4I structur to combine air surveillance, the battle management and the weaponry. Although the PLA has one of the most advanced air defense architectures in the world today, there are still some shortcomings. For example, the PLA and PLA Air Force’s land-based IADS remains seperate from the PLA Navy’s surface-based IADS. If both merge in the near future, China’s air defense capabilities will increase significantly.
Additionally, the deployment of the HQ-9 in the SCS will consolidate the PLA’s forward presence in the region. These fowardly deployed air defenses create a buffer-zone, that provides China with important strategic depth.
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Air Surveillance
Detect, Track and Dentify a Potential Target via Radar or other ISR assets.
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Battle Management
Assess the Threat, Select the Weapon and Make the final Decision to Engage the Target.
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Weaponry
Final Engagement of the Target with a Weapon System..
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C4I
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence...
According to some estimates, land-based Chinese IADS capabilities can reach out as far as 400 km into China’s maritime periphery. Theoretically, that could be true, given the max. reach of around 400 km of the Russian S-400. However, this system must be deployed directly at the coast in order to reach out that far. Additionally, there are some factors, that need to be taken into account.
- Radar capabilities to detect and track the target.
- Size and radar cross section (RCS) of the target.
- Flightpath and aerodynamics of the target.
For example, if an AWACS aircraft can detect and track the target early, a SAM battery can engage the target as soon as possible. Then, if the target is a large slow flying aircraft, there is a chance to actually hit it at long-distance. If the target is also flying directly at the SAM battery, the missile won’t have to maneuver. Provided that these requirements are met, the success is still uncertain, due to many points of failure in the kill-chain. Therefore, viewing air defense as a surefire solution to prevent an enemy from gaining air superiority does not do justice to the complexity of the issue.
Escaping Long-Range Air Defenses
Just as air defenses are not impenetrable, stealth aircraft are not immune to air defenses. It’s a constant struggle between defensive on the one hand and offensive capabilities on the other hand. However, the F-35 has some capabilities and design features, that makes it more survivable in contested environments. Some of them are:
- The RCS of the F-35 is very small due to its stealth characteristics.
- As a fighter aircraft, the F-35 is maneuverable and fast.
- The F-35 can deploy counter measures such as electronic warfare, jammers
- Sensor capabilities can warn the pilot of imminent danger.
This means the F-35 has a good chance of evading or even escaping long-range air defenses. However, since air defenses in an IADS are part of a large network, they are usually covered by other SAM systems. So, there is still a threat from other medium or short-range systems, which can subsequently try to engage the F-35.
Can the F-35 Prevail in Contested Airspace?
Is the F-35 untouchable?
All in all, the F-35 is less likely to be intercepted by air defenses, but is not invulnerable. Particularly when dealing with a combination of multi-layered air defenses and fighter aircraft, the F-35 is still at risk. On the positive side, it provides the U.S. with a platform, that allows for engaging enemy air defenses with more confidence. Due to its stealthy design, the F-35 has a notable advantage when conducting suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions.
For example, the F-35 could remain at a relatively safe distance and provide target data for other platforms, that can launch munitions from stand-off ranges. This keeps the F-35 hidden and the launch-platform out of reach of enemy air defenses. Furthermore, the F-35 might also be accompanied by ISR drones, that can get even closer to the target. Because of such possibility, the survivability of the F-35 would further increase.
Unlike non-stealth aircraft, the F-35, or stealth platforms in general, currently have an advantage over air defense. Therefore, at least for now, aircraft have the initiative – until more powerful radar systems emerge. Despite some drawbacks, it’s definetly a big leap forward in comparison with older aircraft.
Find out whether the F-35 can prevail in contested airspace in our upcoming Part II of this article!
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Explore the South China Sea via Map
Abbrevations
- A2/AD – Anti-Access/Area-Denial
- AWACS – Airborne Early Warning and Control System
- BVRAAM – Beyond Visual Range Air-to-Air Missiles
- C2 – Command & Control
- C4I – Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence
- IADS – Integrated Air Defense Systems
- ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
- OTH – Over-The-Horizon
- PLA – People’s Liberation Army
- PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force
- PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy
- RCS – Radar Cross Section
- SAM – Surface-to-Air Missile
- SCS – South China Sea
- SEAD – Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses
Addendum
[i] The range estimations for the J-20 vary to a large degree. With estimations as low as 800 km and as high as 2,700 km, the range for failure is quite large. According to the principle to rather overestimate a potential adversary, than foolishly underestimating its capabilities, we decided to go with 2,000 km until more reliable data is available.
Sources
https://static.rusi.org/20191118_iads_bronk_web_final.pdf, S. 22 ff
https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/ASPJ/journals/Volume-34_Issue-1/F-McCabe.pdf
https://warontherocks.com/2016/01/how-chinas-new-russian-air-defense-system-could-change-asia/
https://www.af.mil/Portals/1/documents/airpower/Air%20Superiority%202030%20Flight%20Plan.pdf, S. 4
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1128253.pdf
https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1128637.pdf
https://www.jhuapl.edu/sites/default/files/2022-12/InDepthSubiReefCounterStealthRadar.pdf
https://amti.csis.org/accounting-chinas-deployments-spratly-islands/
European Security and the Significance of the F-35
[4] https://csbaonline.org/uploads/documents/Five_Priorities_For_The_Air_Forces_Future_Combat_Air_Force_Web2.pdf, S. 9
Editor’s Note
All illustrations, tables, pictures and given scenarios in this article are for explanatory purposes only and do not show any information, which is not publicly available. The article and its content refrains from making any political statement.
The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.