J-20 x F-22 – Raptors Emerging on the Horizon

Will we witness the F-22 Raptor re-emerge? And can it take on the challenge of securing air superiority over the First Island Chain?

F-22 Playgrounds – A Look at the Map

Here could the J-20 and F-22 Potentially Face Each Other

Since the Chinese Air Force (PLA Air Force) has grown significantly in strength over the last two decades, the U.S. is seeking to increase its military presence to counter Chinese power projection capabilities in the Indo-Pacific. Dominance in the air domain is of particular importance for the U.S., as it requires air superiority as a precondition to utilize the full spectrum of its military capabilities.

J-20

J-20

Mighty Dragon

F-22

F-22

Raptor


For this reason, the U.S. is bringing back one of its iconic fighters to prevent the J-20 from undermining the U.S. ability to establish air superiority – the F-22 Raptor.

As can be seen on the map below, the Chinese coast is surrounded by a chain of island reaching from Japan in the north to the Philippines in the south. This is called the First Island Chain, which is home to numerous air bases from which the U.S. can operate.

J-20

The Chengdu J-20 is China’s first operational stealth fighter and makes the PRC the second country to deploy such technology on large scale. It’s estimated range would allow the J-20 to operate far into the western pacific, which provides the PRC with a strike capability previously only available to the U.S. and its allies.

F-22

The F-22 Raptor is a 5th generation U.S. stealth fighter. Designed with air superiority in mind, the Raptor is a child of the threat environment of the late stages of the Cold War. Without a clear opponent after the fall of the Soviet Union, the Raptor’s capabilities are again in high demand. Is it still up to the job?

IADS

The term Integrated Air Defense Systems (IADS) describes an aggregation of interconnected air defense systems forming a network, which can consist of various sensors, radars, command and control equipment and surface-to-air missile launchers.
Hence, the current air defense envelope of PLA forces is estimated to reach as far as 400 km (216 nautical miles) into the Western Pacific.

Note: The air bases shown in the map below are locations, where the J-20 was allegedly sighted or deployed. However, not all locations have officially been confirmed. In consideration of providing a hypothetical scenario for both the F-22 and the J-20, this setup was chosen.


Roughly speaking, this geography seperates the Chinese from the U.S. military sphere of influence. Not surprisingly, the U.S. is expanding its military presence as China seeks to expand its influence in order to reshape the regional balance of power. As a result, both Great Power inevitably ended up a security competition with each other, which leads to tensions and, in the worst case, outright conflict. Here are some of the locations, where tensions could lead to confrontation:

  • The East China Sea, because of the proximity between Japan and China as well as the ongoing dispute over the Senkaku Islands/ Diaoyu Islands
  • Taiwan as it is the most current flash point in US – China competition
  • The South China Sea is one of the most active area, where disputes lead to ongoing confrontation over claims in the Spratly Islands

Therefore, the first island chain, with Taiwan sitting right in the center, is where both the F-22 and the J-20 are most likely to face each other. Beyond the first island chain there is the second island chain with its most prominent base on the island of Guam.

Deploying the F-22 to Counter the J-20

Given the large base network, which the U.S. has access to, there are several options for deploying the F-22 along the first and second island chains.

Since there are various estimates about the F-22’s combat range, we took the conservative figure of 870 km (470 nm). Albeit not sufficient to reach far into the Chinese mainland, it allows the F-22 to cover most of the Chinese coastline. However, because of its limited numbers, the F-22 will probably deploy to only a few air bases. So , the main question is: where to deploy the F-22 in order to contain a potential threat from the J-20?

As shown above, the infrastructure in South Korea and Japan offers various options for deploying the Raptor to cover the northeastern part of the first island chain. Further to the south, the bases are spread more sparsely. That is partly because Northeast Asia was the U.S.’s main bulwark in the Pacific theater against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Today, the Philippines are just reviving its old ties with the U.S. with the aim of reactivating old bases and also establishing new ones. This would make the area around the South China Sea and Taiwan accessible for U.S. forces.

Given current security developments, the F-22 is most needed around Taiwan and the South China Sea, because these are the locations where the likelihood of conflict is greatest. For a start, the Raptor is rotating in to Kadena Air Base just 600 km north to Taiwan. Furthermore, the planning of new air bases in the Philippines could also imply a shift of focus to this strategically important area. We will take a closer look at that later in the article.


Japan – Stronghold of the F-22

Since Japan is the closest ally of the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, it is expected to be a stronghold of American strategic interests. In addition, the U.S. strategy to contain China while preventing its own military decline in the region will play an important role in Japan’s defense policy. Therefore, the stationing of additional U.S. assets at air bases on Japanese soil seems inevitable given the increasing need of conventional deterrence capabilities against Chinese power projection and potential aggression.

In comparison to other U.S. allies in the region, Japan is home to the largest U.S. contingent abroad. Furthermore, as Japan was an epicenter to contain the Soviet bloc in the Pacific during the Cold War, a large base infrastructure is already in place. That allows the U.S. to have access to a large number of air bases on the main islands of Japan. This puts U.S. forces in an advantageous position to monitor and patrol a large portion of North-East Asia.

Air Base (AB)
Distance to China
J-20 can reach AB
F-22 can reach China
Location
Kadena AB
650 km
Yes
Yes
Air Station Iwakuni
~ 950 km
Yes
No
Yokota AB
1,600 km
Yes
No
Misawa AB
1,700 km*
Close/No
No

The F-22 can easily reach the East China Sea from most Japanese air bases, and can also provide partial coverage of Taiwan from Kadena Air Base. On the contrary, the Chinese J-20 is capable of reaching or getting very close to all highlighted bases in Japan. This makes the stealthy J-20 particularly dangerous for Japanese aircraft, even within their own airspace. Considering that the J-20 is equipped with the PL-15 long-range air-to-air missile, it could potentially remain beyond the reach of Japanese air defenses, if Chinese AWACS aircraft can provide radar coverage that deep inside Japanese airspace.

The F-22 on the Japanese Mainland

Starting with Misawa Air Base in the north, this large air base covers mainly the Sea of Japan. Further, the F-22 could respond to any potential intrusion by enemy aircraft through North Korean or Russian airspace. Compared to other bases on Japanese soil, Misawa Air Base has a large number of hardened shelters. This is particularly important in regard to the growing threat of Chinese ballistic and cruise missiles.

Next, there is Yokota Air Base, which is located near Tokyo and covers mainland Japan as well as the Sea of Japan and part of the Philippine Sea. Unfortunately, this base lacks a sufficient number of hardened shelters, which adversely affects its ability to withstand missile attacks.

Additionally, Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni offers more forwardly located than Yokota Air Base. With sufficient aerial refueling capabilities, the Raptor could cover large parts of the Sea of Japan, East China Sea and Yellow Sea. Any intrusion into South Korean airspace could then be responded to quickly if necessary.

On the negative side, the risk of ballistic or cruise missile strikes increases due of the close distance to China. Given that China’s arsenal of medium- and intermediate-range missiles is growing, stationing the F-22 to Iwakuni could be very risky.

Kadena Air Base – Keystone for U.S. Power Projection in the Pacific

In fact, Kadena Air Base is the United States Air Force’s largest forward base in Japan. Most importantly, it offers significant strategic capabilities, including command & control, ISR and aerial refueling aircraft. In case of a conflict, these capabilities are critical for U.S. air operations, because of their force-multiplying nature.

Given Kadena’s proximity to the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea and to a lesser extent the South China Sea, its importance to the U.S. military presence is out of the question. Without the ability to launch operations from Kadena, U.S. power projection in the region would be much more limited.

Although Kadena Air Base is strategically vital for the U.S., the location has an often overlooked drawback. Due to its proximity to the Chinese coast, Kadena is within range of a large number of Chinese missiles. These include short-range ballistic missiles (SRBM) and surface or air-launched cruise missiles. For example, PLA Navy destroyers could fire YJ-18 or YJ-62 land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) from a relatively safe position near their own shores. Further, the PLA Air Force could launch CJ-10 air-launched cruise missiles (ALCM) from its H-6 bombers.

Even though the Raptor is slowly arriving at Kadena Air Base, there is currently no significant presence of the Raptor in the Chinese periphery. Because of the phased withdrawal of the F-15 Eagle, the F-22 will just replace the aging Eagle currently operating out of Kadena. Consequently, Kadena will receive a more potent air superiority fighter. On the negative side, the total number of fighter aircraft at Kadena is not increasing.

South Korea – F-22 on the Springboard to China

Strategically Significant Geography

The Korean peninsula is of great strategic importance for China and the United States. It is therefore only logical that both sides commit significant amounts of military resources to this region.

Although North Korea acts like a bufferzone, a core interest of China is to prevent any Western power from dominating the peninsula. The reason for this is that the peninsula could serve as a springboard for an invasion into China. Because of the peninsula’s proximity to mainland Chinese and access to the Yellow Sea and the Bohai Gulf, China has an ongoing interest in preventing Western domination of the pensinsula.

Air Base (AB)
Distance to China
J-20 can reach AB
F-22 can reach China
Location
Osan AB
380 km
Yes
Yes
Kunsan AB
380 km
Yes
Yes

Guarding the Korean Peninsula

From the opposite perspective, it’s in the U.S. interest to maintain a large military presence in South Korea. Firstly, to deter North Korean aggression against South Korea. Secondly, due to South Korea’s proximity to China, U.S. aircraft could reach the Chinese mainland very quickly. Therefore, it is easier to deter PLA power projection into north-east Asia.

For example, the PLA Navy’s North Sea Fleet with its aircraft carrier Liaoning operates in this area and is well within range of Osan and Kunsan Air Base. Hence, the F-22 could provide air cover for other stealth aircraft when conducting anti-ship missions or ground-strikes on naval installations. Besides such high-value naval targets, there is a dense network of air bases and other military facilities in this area. Therefore, using the F-22 to guard this strategically important peninsula seems likely, provided it is politically acceptable to South Korea.

Since South Korea is not even 300 km away from China, it is within range of various Chinese fighters and missiles. Especially the J-20 could exploit its low observability to clear the way for a PLA Air Force strike package of anti-ship and ground-attack aircraft. So, instead of using its range for deep penetration, the J-20 could serve as protection for other assets.

The Philippines – Restoring Balance in the South China Sea

Securing the Blind Spots of the First Island Chain

The Philippines is often overlooked in the geostrategic competition between the US and China despite being in a fairly unique position. Looking at the southern flank of the first island chain, the Philippines provide direct access to the South China Sea, which is one of the theater’s major hotspots.

Due to its proximity to the disputed Spratly and Paracel Islands, the response to any eventuality would be much quicker. From a Philippine perspective, this is particularly helpful in resolving the ongoing confrontations over the disputed territories in the Spratly Islands.

Air Base
Distance to China
J-20 can reach AB
F-22 can reach China
Location
Cesar Basa AB
1,000 km
Yes
No
Clark AB
1,000 km
Yes
No
Antonio Bautista AB
1,300 km
Yes
No
Mactan-Benito Ebuen AB
1,600 km
No
No

Expanding Base Infrastructure to Counter Chinese Expansion in the South China Sea

The gradual plan to build more air bases on Philippine territory will create additonal base options for the F-22 close to the South China Sea by improving U.S.-Philippine relations. There are currently at least four air bases that would allow the F-22 to take off and land on their runways.

Generally, this would represent an improvement for the U.S. to counter the growing PLA presence in the South China Sea. Particularly problematic is the PLA Air Force’s ability to deploy fighter aircraft and bombers from its artificially built islands in the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Here, the PLA has built deep-sea ports, large radar facilities and air defenses, allowing easier monitoring and patrolling of the South China Sea by PLA forces. These efforts shifted the military balance in favor of the PLA.

With the Philippines now planning to expand their base infrastructure, the U.S. has a better chances of restoring military dominance in this area. In addition, air bases south of Taiwan will strengthen U.S. deterrence against possible aggression against Taiwan.

From China’s perspective, the J-20 can reach the majority of Philippine air bases. However, the more important mission for the PLA would be to secure the airspace over the South China Sea. Thus, the J-20 is expected to conduct continuous operations to monitor foreign activities, because of its strategic importance.

F-22 Guarding the Entrance to the Pacific

Another lesser-known strategic advantage for the U.S. is the ability to seal off the Luzon Strait, which is a key transit channel from the South China Sea to the Pacific. This strait lies between Taiwan and the northern islands of the Philippines and is roughly 320 km wide. If the U.S. and the Philippines remain in control over this strait, it will greatly improve their ability to contain Chinese forces within the confines of the first island chain.

From Clark and Cesar Basa Air Base the Raptor is able to cover the entirety of the strait. Hence, the F-22 could then be used to guard this area in order to prevent PLA incursions into the Pacific. Even if the F-22 does not have anti-ship capabilities, it could secure the airspace for anti-ship operations.

As shown above, U.S. deterrence capabilities in this region would greatly benefit from deploying the Raptor to the Philippines. For this reason, the Philippines remains an important partner in securing the southern flank of the first island chain.

Conclusion – Can the F-22 Secure Air Superiority over the First Island Chain?

Protect the F-22 on the Ground, so It can Dominate the Skies

Access to more air bases along the first island chain provides greater flexbility in redeploying the F-22, if necessary. This ability is of particular importance given the lack of hardened shelters at most air bases in the region. It’s important to recognize that this deficiency threatens the overall resilience of U.S. base infrastructure. Furthermore, it reduces the survivability of american and allied aircraft on the ground in the event of a missile attack.

This curcumstance will put the Raptor in even greater danger, if it is not physically protected from missile attacks. Given that the Raptor requires a sound infrastructural footing in order to fulfill its role, the U.S. must consider investing in its overseas air bases to address this issue.

A Counter to China’s Regional Advantages

Regardless of technical specifications and capabilities, it’s important to note, that the PLA Air Force enjoys a substantial regional advantage. Mostly because Chinese forces have direct access to the theater of operations. In contrast, the U.S. must move its forces halfway around the globe, which takes time and resources.

From the Chinese perspective, this proximitay enables Chinese aircraft to concentrate and strike with superior numbers. Then, China’s numerous air bases allow for quick redeployment and, most importantly, easy access to supporting infrastructure and logistics.

Therefore, the J-20 is not the only challenge facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The PLA’s increasingly sophisticated support infrastructure gives China a regional advantage that the U.S. cannot match. That means, the PLA can produce, maintain and repair its J-20s close to where these aircraft actually operate. Despite these drawbacks, the F-22 is still considered more capable than the J-20, even if that cannot be independently verified. Whether the Raptor can negate the J-20’s growing numerical advantage remians to be seen. Still, the F-22 is a step in the right direction in guarding the airspace over the first island chain.

Consequently, power projection by the PLA Air Force will at least be more difficult. Whether that is enough to deter PLA air operations or even aggression is doubtful. However, as part of a larger defensive framework, the F-22 is currently the best the U.S. has to offer for the job.

Impact of the F-22

  • Impede PLA Air Force operations in the region

Firstly, the Raptor’s presence will be an impediment for the J-20’s operational freedom within the first island chain and beyond. Moreover, it will hinder the J-20’s role within the PLA’s anti-access and area-denial (A2AD) efforts, which seek to deny the U.S. military the ability to deploy and sustain forces within the theater of operations.

  • Integrate into a larger defense network

Secondly, using the F-22 as a stand-alone element won’t allow the Raptor to reach its full potential. That means it must be supported by other platforms such as AWACS aircraft for communication, intelligence and command & control. Therefore, the Raptor’s performance depends heavily on its integration into a larger defense network.

  • Improve U.S. conventional deterrence capabilities in the first island chain

Thirdly, by deploying the Raptor to the first island chain, the U.S. can strengthen its conventional deterrence capabilities in the region. Consequently, that will put the U.S. in a better position in the event of a conflict. Furthermore, the F-22 represents a more than effective medium-term solution until the Air Force’s 6th generation fighter becomes available.

According to the points made in this article, the presence of the Raptor is likely to subsequently affect the PLA’s power projection capabilities in the region. Particularly in terms of deploying its 5th generation J-20. At the same time, U.S. forces will benefit from the integration of the F-22 into their defense framework in the Indo-Pacific.


Thank you

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Explore the South China Sea via Map


  • A2/AD – Anti-Access/Area-Denial
  • AWACS – Airborne Early Warning and Control System
  • C2 – Command & Control
  • IADS – Integrated Air Defense Systems
  • ISR – Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
  • PLA – People’s Liberation Army
  • PLAAF – People’s Liberation Army Air Force
  • PLAN – People’s Liberation Army Navy

Editor’s Note

All illustrations, tables, pictures and given scenarios in this article are for explanatory purposes only and do not show any information, which is not publicly available. The article and its content refrains from making any political statement.

The appearance of U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) visual information does not imply or constitute DoD endorsement.

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